Gomez-Quiñones on the PLM

So I’ve been working on narrowing the focus of my thesis so as to make it a bit more manageable to finish. Since I have an interest in revolutionary organization and libertarian politics, I’m adjusting the thesis to tell the story of the Mexican Revolution through an in-depth look at the Partido Liberal Mexicano (PLM – best known for being led by anarchist Ricardo Flores Magón). There’s certain limitations with such a study: the philosophical limitations of anarchist analysis, the organizational shortcomings of the PLM itself (and anarchist organization historically), to name just two.

Yet despite these, or maybe because of these, I feel like a lot can be gleaned from such a study. What’s more, the PLM was active from about 1900 to the end of the Revolution, which makes it a very useful organization through which to trace the development of the wider political and social climate, what pertinent organizational questions developed over time and through struggle, what were the politics and social forces behind the counter-revolution against the popular democratic elements at the grassroots, and much more.

I picked up Juan Gomez-Quiñones’ Sembradores Ricardo Flores Magón y el Partido Liberal Mexicano: A Eulogy and Critique in this turn towards the PLM. It’s an older text, from 1973, but still useful. He raises a number of arguments regarding the efficacy and problems that the PLM faced as a revolutionary organization, which are briefly listed below:

a. The PLM was not a fully developed revolutionary party; it did not have a stable mass membership or a fully developed set of tactics; did have a revolutionary ideology and was a proto organization of revolutionary organizers.

b. Anarchism in general was most successful subjectively in ideals, criticism, and heroism. Its failure was that it was theoretically poor and tactically bankrupt (“its record of revolutionary-organizational failures is matched only by Trotskyites.” p. 12). Anarchist recruits heavily drawn from social elements increasingly marginalized in a changing society, particularly those in transition from agrarian to semi-industrial production – social outlaws, the misfits, the declasse petite-bourgeoisie, los destripados.[1]

c. Yet The PLM contained intellectuals and quasi-industrial urban elements as well as some artisans, and to a lesser degree involved campesinos. Thus in Mexico and the U.S. Southwest, despite its agrarian myths and emphasis, PLM’s appeal was to "modern elements" and not to the social elements that were being superseded.

d. Three or so layers to PLM organizers/members: 1) a large layer composed of Chicanos and Mexicanos who were sympathizers and periodically active, coming mainly from the lower middle class, artisans, laborers; 2) local cores of leadership, mostly Chicano, district organizers, chapter officers, local journalists who were transmitters and interpreters of PLM policy -- all usually active for extended periods of time; 3) the binational leadership, mostly Mexicano, who were educated (both formally and informally), full-time organizers/theoreticians who developed policy and cross-border solidarity.[2]

e. Regeneración (one of the main newspapers published by the PLM) was pivotal for maintaining the vibrancy, the communication, and the spirit of the organization. The paper was how locals knew what was going on in other locals; how they could see party interpretation of events; how their activity and successes could be known to others. When the paper would arrive, groups often formed and the literate would read to those who couldn't read. Discussion and debate would last for days. It was also pertinent for recruitment and spreading the word about the work and ideas of the PLM.

f. Regeneración reflected the process of the movement in Mexico and the experience of radical exiles in the U.S. From 1910 on a radicalization was taking place, the principal motto changed from “Reforma, Libertad y Justicia” to “Tierra y Libertad”.

g. In January 1911 the PLM put out a manifesto calling for direct expropriation and redistribution of land by the people; urged women’s participation in the revolutionary process. Yet politically and economically the 1911 manifesto was naïve and not analytical or viable. The beliefs in spontaneous united action were exhortations and not a viable program for revolution.

h. Problems of organization, strategy, and political analysis marred the Baja California offensive in 1910-1911. It was not only one more failure of the PLM, but also a costly political mistake. The motivations for the attack included the PLM's rejection of bourgeois nationalism and international boundaries (the PLM was carrying this out in part from the U.S.), class solidarity, and multiracial struggle. Baja was isolated and was sparsely inhabited, thus there was a political vacuum, unlike most of the rest of Mexico where there existed competing efforts at establishing political hegemony. Further, an attack in Baja would be a direct assault on the holdings of foreign companies, which were a dominant force shaping Mexican economic and political life. Baja was easily accessible by land and sea. Its takeover was also conceived as a means for securing a base for extending revolution to other parts of Mexico and for establishing a model for anarchist society [propaganda of the deed].

i. The PLM was marred by factionalism, ideological and personal, and the long list of splits over the years had a debilitating effect on the leadership of PLM (its consistency, its talent, etc.).

Notes
[1] Gomez-Quiñones doesn’t explain how the U.S. was also an exception to this characterization, particularly in the late 19th and early 20th centuries when anarchist organizers found a good deal of support and popularity for their ideas and methods among the industrial working class.
[2] As can be seen within these layers, it'll be necessary to provide a larger explanation of why and how the PLM came to have a bi-national membership, how the U.S.-Mexico border and exile played into this, and what advantages and problems such a constitution presented.